THE TESTAMENT OF HENRY SIMONS*
JoH DAvENPoRTt

HE old economics," wrote Henry Simons a year ago in his devastating review of the Beveridge program, "is commended by its
normative implications ..... Its strength is in its implied political philosophy. Its wisdom is that of seeking solutions which are within
the rule of law, compatible with great dispersion or deconcentration of
power ..... Certainly another kind of system, ruled by authorities, might
be more efficient and more progressive-if one excludes liberty as an aspect
of efficiency and capacity for freedom and responsibility, among individuals and among nations, as a measure of progress. Discretionary authorities, omniscient and benevolent, surely could in some sense do better
than any scheme involving democratic, legislative rules ..... But some
of us dislike government by authorities, partly because we think they
would not be wise and good and partly because we would still dislike it if
they were."
Henry Simons, professor of economics at the University of Chicago, is
dead but he has left behind him an enduring testament. It is a testament
of the worth of political economy-the type of thought, so conspicuously
absent in our times, that marries economic analysis to political values. It
is a testament of liberty profoundly prejudicial to all collectivist solutions.
Simons took up that fight early when the majority of the American intelligentsia had lost faith in American tradition and were looking to
Moscow if not to Berlin to point the way of the future. Now that the folly
and inhumanity of all-out statist planning are apparent to all but the blind,
it is perhaps unnecessary to labor the negative contribution of his philosophy. But the fact is that the prodigal sons, who are currently coming
home from the world of totalitarianism, have no positive program for the
U.S. in their pockets. American liberalism is in a state of complete confusion if not collapse.
It is in this context that the work of Henry Simons takes on profound
importance. For it was his privilege and duty to reassert in an age of
doubt the truth of libertarian doctrine and to adapt it to the needs of the
times. For his pains he was called a reactionary by professional leftists and
a daigerous radical by some conservatives. But the more his writings are
studied, the more it will be found that he was a conservative in the best
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sense of that word (conservare-to conserve) and a radical only in the
sense of a man who goes to the roots. "A political movement," he wrote,
"which is conservative in its objectives must be radical in terms of its
means. Those who hope for dictatorship, whether under proletarian or
fascist symbols, may rather fittingly refer to us as the impractical visionaries."
CAPITALISM AND THE POLITICAL STATE

The vision that Simons offered to this country was old, and it was new.
It was old in that it rested on the dignity and worth of the individual and
on the belief that the bulwark of individual liberty cannot be disassociated
from the preservation of the free competitive market. "The great enemy
of democracy," wrote Simons, "is monopoly, in all its forms: gigantic corporations, trade associations and other agencies for price control, trade
unions-or, in general, organization and concentration of power within
functional classes." But it was likewise his business to reassert what is implicit in all liberal thinking but too easily forgotten, that free competition
cannot be preserved without a government able and willing to lay down
the rules of the road. "The representation of laissez-faire as a do-nothing
policy is unfortunate and misleading. It is an obvious responsibility of the
state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional
framework within which competition can function effectively as an agency
of control." For Simons this meant on the one hand the rigorous prosecution of antitrust policy, and on the other hand an honest and effective
monetary policy designed to prevent boom and violent deflation. His indictment of American government was that it had done neither: "The
so-called failure of capitalism may reasonably be interpreted as primarily
a failure of the political state in the discharge of its minimum responsibilities under capitalism."
A MIDWEST PRODUCT

The issue that Simons drew was therefore not between plan and no
plan but between planning for freedom and planning against it. When he
died June 19 in Chicago at the age of forty-six he stood at the height of his
intellectual powers but had scarcely come into his own. A twenty-fiveline obituary in the New York Times was deemed sufficient to tell his story
and no doubt accurately reflected his popular fame. New Deal prophets,
who had felt the whiplash of his invective, of course knew of and respected
him. Businessmen busy about the work of the world were largely too busy
to understand his contribution to the system they never tire of eulogizing.
Simons was a midwest product. He was born October i9, 1899, in the
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little mining town of Virden, Illinois. He was educated at the universities
of Iowa, Michigan, and at Chicago where he was closely associated with
that profound scholar of liberalism, Frank Knight. Students remember
him not for his platform manner but for his quiet, ever persuasive conversation. In appearance he suggested at times the capable man of affairs,
and his interest in practical political questions was intense. But Simons
made few trips to the nation's capital, holding that scholars are lucky if
they have some little influence not on day-to-day events but on basic
ideas. His energy flared within.
Simons left behind him one completed full-size book, PersonalIncome
Taxation. His lasting influence will also rest on a small tract, A Positive
Programfor Laissez Faire, published by the University of Chicago in
1934, and a handful of great reviews and articles largely published by the
Journal of Political Economy. These include "Rules vs. Authority in
Monetary Policy" (February, 1936), "Hansen on Fiscal Policy" (April,
1942), "Some Reflections on Syndicalism" (March, 1944), "On Debt
Policy" (December, 1944), and finally "The Beveridge Program: An Unsympathetic Interpretation" (September, 1945). Other occasional essays
will be included in a forthcoming book. But the above articles, scattered
fragments though they be, are enough to give the drive and power of his
thought.
Rereading these articles today, one is struck with the brilliance of
Simons' expository power as well as with some glaring defects. As a writer
Simons never sufficiently distinguished between those phases of his
thought that were fit material for the "mighty line" and those phases
that called for more sober presentation. He wrote at full gallop whether
his subject was the sins of collectivist philosophy or whether it was the sins
of "fractional banking." He scaled the heights of rhetoric only to fall at
times heavily into the depths of maddening obscurity. In his review of Dr.
Alvin Hansen's book, Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles, Simons loses
many a trick by dealing with the intricacies of monetary theory in the
tone of a Cicero denouncing Catiline. Yet few essays touch Simons' opening where eulogy of Hansen's skill as writer and thinker wickedly leads up
to the paragraph beginning: "But I come to bury Hansen-albeit respectfully and despairingly." And few drive on to more devastating conclusions: "There is no sense in designing elegant financial appurtenances
for an institutional structure whose foundations of free exchange, free
enterprise, and free occupational migration are disintegrating rapidlyunless one is prepared to give some attention to these foundations too.
Hansen's prescriptions seem excellently contrived to hasten the disintegration."
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RULES VERSUS CHAOS

Simons' quarrel with Dr. Hansen and "that substantial company of
intellectuals, following Keynes and recklessly collectivist, whose influence
grows no less rapidly in academic circles than in Washington" can be understood only in terms of his broad indictment of the New Deal. While
,posing as a liberal "reform" movement, bent on saving the enterprise
system, the New Deal in fact stood for a series of improvisations reactionary in their long-run implications. As early as 1934 Simons wrote: "One
cannot criticize the policies of the present administration without seeming
to approve those of its predecessors. In fact, one must condemn the Democrats mainly for their wholesale extension of the worst policies of the past.
The NRA is merely Mr. Hoover's trust policy and wage policy writ large.
The agricultural measures and many other planning proposals are the logical counterpart and the natural extensions of Republican protectionism.
The gold policy and the silver legislation, like the Federal Reserve System,
lead from a bad monetary and banking system only into something
worse."
As the above passage indicates, Simons was the first to argue that the
debacle of 1929 called for strong monetary reform. Indeed, a properly
functioning money system might have greatly mitigated, if not prevented,
the excesses of the twenties. What appalled him as the thirties wore on
were the temporizing measures undertaken in this field by the Administration, and their political consequences. Undertaken first as an emergency
measure, deficit financing was soon justified as necessary on the ground
that the American economy had achieged permanent "maturity." What
was begun out of humanitarian motives degenerated into the cynicism
attributed to Harry Hopkins: "We shall spend and spend, and tax and
tax, and elect and elect."
Clearly here was no new fiscal morality worthy of the name. Sound
monetary policy, Simons held, must be based on some kind of rule and
principle. The proper rule for government action, he came to believe, was
not the maintenance of this or that level of employment (a criterion
peculiarly subject to "politicking") but the maintenance of a tolerably
stable level of prices, or what amounts to the same thing, a tolerably stable
American dollar. To this end he held that government must assume primary responsibility for the money supply, taking this crucial power away
from the commercial banks. But at the same time government itself must
be far more economical in its exercise of power than at present-and far
more honest.
Specifically, Simons hoped that the clear-cut assumption by government of responsibility for money might in itself greatly reduce the need for
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positive fiscal action. Whereas spenders constantly emphasized bigger and
bigger federal appropriations as a means of stimulating the economydreaming up all manner of work projects and so-called "investments"Simons pointed out that the money supply can be just as well increased
in time of depression by reduction of taxes. Finally, he saw only obfuscation, if not dishonesty, in the constant financing of government deficits
through enormous borrowing operations. If the state wishes to increase
the money supply let it openly print. If it wishes to decrease the money
supply let it retire currency through either taxes or the issue of long-term
bonds to the public. Under an ideal system, Simons held, the government
would deal in only two kinds of paper: currency and consols, or perpetuities, selling in the free and open market. "I have never seen," he wrote in
"On Debt Policy," "any sense in an elaborate structure of federal debt.
The national government must, of course, provide and regulate the currency-a task it has never faced ..... In wartime and in peacetime we
should issue currency and (or) bonds. We should never disguise currency
as bonds or conversely."
These necessarily technical suggestions should not obscure Simons'
main point. What distinguished him from most "new economists" was his
insistence that if the state is responsible for maintaining over-all stability
it cannot proceed on an ad hoc and discretionary basis. There must be a
true "monetary constitution." "An enterprise system cannot function
effectively in the face of extreme uncertainty ..... We must avoid a
situation where every business venture becomes largely a speculation on
the future of monetary policy." But to his everlasting credit he also saw
that monetary prescriptions were not enough. Sticky prices and wages
played their part in intensifying the crash of 1929. Conversely a government bent on arresting depression must always see its hopes dashed unless
it follows through with other measures to encourage enterprise. In the
event, the New Deal never was able to generate full recovery until the
exigencies of war put the whole American population to work. But the
experience of war, as Simons pointed out, proves if anything too much.
War spending "worked" but only at the cost of the institution of direct
control over rising prices and wages. Without these controls-as Beveridge in England has now admitted-unrestricted spending to produce
full employment becomes simply an invitation to perpetual inflation.
TRADE UNIONS

Simons believed in the very antithesis of direct price and wage controls-i.e., in the beneficent forces of competition to keep prices in line
and to hold wage rates where employment will be maximized rather than
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fatally restricted. In the end his emphasis on competitive doctrine, and
his courage to apply it without let or favor, is therefore his lasting contribution. Simons' corporate reforms would, if applied, be about as popular
among U. S. industrialists as were his ideas in the field of banking. He was
suspicious of the vaunted internal economies of "bigness"; at least he
wanted to be shown. For natural monopolies he proposed outright socialization as better than government regulation. But for the great run of
business enterprises he proposed simple if far-reaching measures including
transfer to the federal government of the exclusive power to charter, limitation upon the total amount of property that any corporation can hold,
and limitation on control of subsidiary corporations.
But it was not in industry, he correctly saw, that the crucial problem of
monopoly must be faced in our day, but in organized labor. His reluctance
to tackle the subject-his hope that somehow the problem might right itself-is instanced by the fact that though he wrote "Some Reflections
on Syndicalism" in 1941, he held up publication until 1944. The opening
paragraph of the essay is sufficient explanation of his hesitancy. "Questioning the virtues of the organized labor movement," he wrote, "is like
attacking religion, monogamy, motherhood or the home ..... Discussion
of skeptical views runs almost entirely in terms of how one came by such
persuasions, as though they were symptoms of some disease. One simply
cannot argue that organization is injurious to labor; one is either for labor
or against it, and the test is one's attitude toward unionism."
Simons was in the deepest sense pro-labor and openly skeptical of the
worth of powerful trade unions. "If unionism were good for labor as a
whole, that would be the end of the issue for me, since the community
whose welfare concerns us is composed overwhelmingly of laborers." But
trade unions of course do not represent the community as a whole but
rather a special-interest group in the community. They are, no less than
trade associations and other monopolies, organizations of producers, and
"all the grosser mistakes in economic policy, if not most manifestations of
democratic corruption, arise from focusing upon the interests of people as
producers rather than upon their interests as consumers, i.e., from acting
on behalf of producer minorities rather than on behalf of the whole community as sellers of services and buyers of products."
As might be expected, Simons laid stress on the adverse effect of unionism on new investment, dearth of which according to most New Deal
economists was the reason for the prolonged depression of the thirties.
"The phenomenal deficiency of private investment in recent years requires
for explanation no recourse to factually unsupported (and, I believe, gross-
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ly false) conjectures about 'real' investment opportunities. I believe that
investment opportunities were never so large as now; that our highest
thrift would not for generations pernhit enough investment to lower interest rates substantially, if owners of new capital assets could be assured of
free-market access to labor and other complementary factors (mainly
indirect labor). But the prospect of such access has diminished everywhere. Every new enterprise and every new investment must now pay
heavy tribute to labor (and other monopolies) in acquiring its plant and
equipment; and it faces the prospect of increasing extortion in its efforts
to utilize facilities after they are constructed. (Labor monopolies are highly concentrated in construction and in capital-goods industries generally;
they are also peculiarly characteristic of the more capital-intensive industries.)"
But trade-unionism in its present form is not only bad for the free flow
of capital, and thus indirectly harmful to labor, it is directly harmful to
labor itself. Labor's interest is obviously to have free entry into and egress
from any and all occupations. And presupposing a sound and stable currency, Simons argued the proper wage is "the lowest wage that will bring
forth an adequate supply of labor in competition with other employment
opportunities." Trade unions block this process. They can and do prevent
entrance into specific trades. They can and do put wages in specific industries so high as to cause not more but less employment. "The semblance of
struggle between labor and capital conceals the substantial conflict between ....established workers in more remunerative occupations and
workers elsewhere. The masses of unorganized and unorganizable lose as
consumers; they lose by being denied access to higher-wage areas; and
they lose by an artificial abundance of labor in the markets where they
must sell, i.e., by being forced to compete with workers who should have
been drawn off into the higher-wage occupations. And let no one infer that
their problem would be solved if they too were organized. The monopoly
racket, like that of tariffs and subsidies, works only so long as it is exceptional-works only to advantage minorities relatively, with overall diseconomy and loss."
THE EXAIPLE OF EUROPE

Simons' case against unionism was the same as his case against monopoly everywhere. Corporate organization is justified where competition
acts to establish prices. But what curb, Simons asked, could be found for
strong, entrenched unions? The question, arising in the course of economic
analysis, led him as always out into the broader field of political conse-
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quences. "Unionists are much like our communist friends. They are good
fighters and like fighting for its own sake. They are extremely effective at
undermining the political and economic system which we have but are
surprisingly unconcerned and inarticulate about the nature of the world
which they would create afterward." The tendency of unions to get into
politics is natural, but it may be no more amicable to democratic institutions than the appearance in Washington of other powerful pressure
groups. Nor, Simons astutely argued, does socialism offer a way out. "A
socialist government, faced with numerous functional minorities, each
organized to disrupt the whole productive process unless its demands are
met, would be exactly in the position of recent Chinese governments faced
with great bandit armies continuously collecting ransom from the nominal
sovereign. It would either deprive such minorities of the power to act as
units in withholding services or be displaced by a non-democratic authority which could and would restore monopoly of violence."
The experience of Russia would more than bear out Simons' contention. The experience of postwar England yields little evidence either way
since the Labor government's socialization schemes remain largely on
paper. But Simons saw no reason to follow European example: "I do not
maintain that German trade unions caused I.G. Farben and the Nazi
revolution, or that French labor caused the disintegration of the French
army, or that I.C.I. and the awful state of English industry are attributable to national collective bargaining. I do hold that large and powerful
labor unions are integral elements in a total institutional complex whose
development is everywhere antithetical to economic freedom, to political
liberty, and to world peace; that we should here stop the development
short of the German or French denouement and short of the awful mess
which is now the English economy; and that we cannot import and retain
the labor-organization component of this complex or trend without importing the rest of it too. If western Europe had maturity in collective
bargaining and labor relations and if England has it still, these facts argue
strongly against abandoning our democratic adolescence. We must alter
our labor policy or abandon our antitrust policy-as English businessmen
recommend."
FEDERATION AND F

EE TRADE

Simons' views on trade-unionism lead, naturally, over to his internationalist position. Despite his profound dislike for the cartelization
schemes espoused by British businessmen and for the multiple planning
measures proposed by British labor, and despite the fact that working and
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teaching in the heart of the Midwest he was everywhere subject to isolationist pressure, Simons was an early interventionist. He saw the war for
what it was: an attempt to save what we know as civilization from unmitigated evil; and his doubts on European socialism and his hatred of
communism did not throw him into the error of seeing something good,
or at least something one could be neutral toward, in Hitlerism. The
scholar who drew his principal inspiration from that long line of British
liberals from Adam Smith and Mill to Marshall, and who derived so much
stimulation (to put it mildly) from the writings of Lord Keynes, was not
likely to miss the mutuality of interest holding Britain and the U.S.
together.
He went further. Deploring the nationalist tendencies of British planners, he equally applauded the true internationalist tendencies inherent
in the British Empire, whose unity through decentralization formed a
pattern for the only kind of world unity he could understand. In so far as
he allowed himself to speculate on the ideal of a world order his thought
turned not to some monstrous superstate-itself an intolerable monopoly
able to destroy its members-but rather to a federation of equal states
drawn together by common ideals of political justice and bound one to
another through free and unfettered trade. "The peace will be won or lost
on the simple issue of economic disarmament. The extreme nationalism of
high protection, quota limitations, exchange controls, and bilateral trading must be swept away, at least among the leading protagonists of the
present conflict. But movement in this direction cannot come unless there
is wholesale economic disarmament also within these nations."
For Simons, free competition at home and free trade abroad were two
sides of the same coin. And precisely because of the weakness of the British
position (to say nothing of the statism of Russia) he came back
again and again to the question of American leadership. In his article
"The U.S. Holds the Cards" (Fortune, September, 1944) he set out a
monetary policy that might make the dollar, in conjunction with the
pound sterling, a stable currency for over half the world. But his principal
emphasis fell, as might be expected, not on money but on the free flow of
goods across international borders. "American protectionism is simply
done for. It is the utterly unrealistic prescription for the future. If we try
to maintain it, we shall find ourselves with an institutional anomaly
wholly unsuited to its world environment ..... Surely conservatives
would repudiate Congressional manipulation of trade via tariffs if they
knew it must lead to creation of a federal authority that would administer
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all our purchases and sales abroad and, in effect, prohibit all private
negotiation of such contracts."
Simons died before the outlines of the peace were dearly defined. Perhaps for his own state of mind, never too peaceful, it was just as well.
But who will doubt that with his passing a star, if not of the first magnitude, at least of the second, has fallen? His monetary theories remain to be
tested; his strictures against erring tycoons and labor leaders will be resented; all this will be matter for Ph.D. theses for years to come. But in its
grand outlines his testament will: stand the test of time. He came to
maturity when it was particularly necessary that some American stand up
for the principles on which the republic was founded and fit them to the
complexities of the day. In proposing that we render unto government the
things that are government's and unto the free spirit the things that only
freedom can accomplish he fulfilled his task. That-and one thing more.
In taking his stand for liberalism in a day of reaction, Simons tried to reverse the malignant tendency that made many believe that first communism and then Hitlerism represented some kind of"wave of the future"the tendency to bow to the inevitable.
"It is easy," Simons wrote, in full consciousness of all that his position
implied, "to argue that the whole problem is so hard and ominous politically that no effort should be made to solve or even to see it-that the
real choice lies between a certain, gradual death of economic democracy
and an operation or treatment which would cure if successful but is almost
certain to kill. I am no forecaster and am not in direct communication
with the Almighty. Consequently, I can only maintain that it is immoral
to take such absolute dilemmas seriously. Democracy would have been
dead a thousand times if it paid much attention to historical extrapolations; and it is perhaps unnecessary to discuss now the shortcomings of
temporizing expedients or appeasement."

